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Abstract
Using a nationwide county-level panel dataset for the years 1995-2009, this paper conducts the first analysis in the literature to examine the impacts of fiscal decentralization
and fiscal equalization, both measured at the sub-provincial level, on intra-provincial
inequality in China. While fiscal decentralization offers significant advantages regarding public expenditure efficiency, a potentially large disadvantage is that it may lead
to increased regional inequality. In this paper, in line with our theoretical hypotheses, we find that while fiscal decentralization at the sub-provincial level in China leads
to larger intra-provincial inequality, fiscal equalization efforts performed by provincial
governments tend to mitigate the detrimental effect of fiscal decentralization on intraprovincial inequality. Our results also indicate that the quantitative effects of fiscal
decentralization on regional inequality tend to be larger when they are measured from
the expenditure side, which is consistent with the fact that expenditure decentralization is a much more meaningful measure of decentralization in China. Overall, we
provide evidence on the potential inequality costs of using fiscal decentralization as
a development strategy. At the same time, we emphasize the importance of implementing a fiscal equalization program to ensure the overall success of decentralization
policy.
Keywords: Fiscal decentralization; equalization, intra-provincial inequality; China
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1 Introduction
China’s economic growth over the past decades has been remarkable. However, this
growth has been uneven across the country, resulting in significant and still growing regional inequality in economic development, with the inland regions lagging far behind the
coastal regions. An ever-increasing body of research has attempted to describe and explain
the patterns of regional inequality in China (see Wang et al., 2014, for a recent survey),
even though the various dimensions of this issue have not received the same degree of attention in the literature (Tsui, 1993). The general research agenda has mainly focused on
the dimensions of inland-coastal inequality, rural-urban inequality, and inter-provincial inequality at the aggregated country level. Just a few studies have examined intra-provincial
inequality at the sub-provincial level, in large part due to the lack of detailed data at the
sub-provincial level in the early years of this research. Further investigation targeting this
type of inequality, nevertheless, is vital because intra-provincial inequality accounts for the
majority of the overall regional inequality in the country (e.g., Tsui, 1993; Cheong and Wu,
2012). As estimated by Cheong and Wu (2012), intra-provincial inequality based on countylevel data contributed roughly 60% of China’s overall inequality in 2007, and an increase in
intra-provincial inequality contributed to 63% of the increase in overall inequality in China
during the 1997-2007 period. Thus, a better understanding of the patterns of intra-provincial
inequality and especially of its determinants should play an important role in the design of
national policies addressing the overall level of regional inequality in China.
Given that the nature of intra-provincial inequality is naturally within provinces and
that there is substantial variation of this type of inequality across provinces, the general
determinants of this type of inequality need to be sought in some good measure at the subnational level. Among those potential determinants we are particularly interested in the
role played by fiscal decentralization policies at the sub-provincial level, which are largely
formulated at the discretion of provincial governments, especially on the expenditure side of
the budget.
1

Two key questions guide our analysis. First, does fiscal decentralization at the subprovincial level contribute to higher intra-provincial inequality?

While decentralization

through empowering local governments and satisfying the heterogeneous preferences of the
constituents has been viewed as enhancing efficiency and economic growth, its implications
for the evolution of regional inequality remain an open question. Second, what roles do fiscal equalization policies pursued by provincial governments play in offsetting the impact of
provincial fiscal decentralization on intra-provincial inequality? As an important supplemental policy of decentralization reform in China, fiscal equalization was introduced and scaled
up over the past decade to ameliorate regional fiscal disparities. However, a substantial
variation of equalization efforts exists across provinces, and in addition, the actual performance of those equalization programs suffers from institutional deficiencies and the possible
predatory behaviors of some provincial governments (Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2008).
Using county-level data for the years 1995-2009, this paper contributes to the literature
in three significant ways. First, utilizing both cross-section and time-series information we
conduct for the first time in the literature an examination of the impact of fiscal decentralization policies at the sub-provincial level on intra-provincial inequality. The extant literature,
mainly focused on inter-provincial disparities (by using provincial-level data), has been unable to capture the dynamics of the patterns and variations of inequality below the provincial
level. In addition, our analysis based on both cross-section and time-series information provides more accurate and unbiased estimates for the impact of fiscal decentralization policies
on regional inequality than other past studies on China, which have relied only on time-series
information at the aggregated country level (e.g., Kanbur and Zhang, 2005; Song, 2013). Second, we investigate the impacts of fiscal decentralization at the sub-provincial level in China.
Although fiscal decentralization in China has attracted worldwide attention, research at the
sub-provincial level has been much rarer.1 Nevertheless, an analysis at the sub-provincial
level appears to be more justified because sub-provincial governments in China provide the
1

Recent studies by Uchimura and Jütting (2009), Brehm (2013), Wu and Wang (2013) are notable
exceptions in this regard.
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majority of essential public services such as education and health care (World Bank, 2002;
Gong and Wu, 2011); therefore, without examining the impact of decentralization at this
level, it may be difficult to gauge the actual impact of decentralization on regional inequality. In addition, provincial governments in China have been granted substantial discretion in
determining their own fiscal decentralization policy within their borders, which actually has
given rise to a high level of variation in sub-provincial treatments. This variation is so substantial that it even outweighs the variation of fiscal decentralization policies across European
countries (Dollar and Hofman, 2008). As the geographic areas of many Chinese provinces
are equivalent to those of many European countries, a panel study of sub-provincial decentralization in China presents the additional advantage of avoiding the potential unobserved
heterogeneity that may exist in the relevant cross-country studies of fiscal decentralization
(see Ezcurra and Pascual, 2008; Lessmann, 2009; Sorens, 2014).2 Third, we explicitly explore
the role played by the provinces’ fiscal equalization efforts in offsetting the impacts of fiscal
decentralization on regional inequality. At present, all central government transfers have
to go through provincial governments before reaching the various layers of sub-provincial
governments, even in the case of those transfers that have been specifically designed for
sub-provincial governments (Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2008). Clearly, the availability of fiscal resources and the choices of intermediate-level governments, and here we mean mostly
provincial governments, can play an important role in determining the observed outcomes
within provinces.
In what follows, we discuss in section 2 the theoretical debate on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and regional inequality and the potential role played by fiscal
equalization. We then set up the empirical methodology and discuss the data in section 3.
In section 4 we present the main empirical results, and in section 5 we provide some further
robustness checks for the empirical results. In section 6 we conclude.
2

These studies, based on data for OECD countries or European Union countries, tend to find a negative
relationship between fiscal decentralization and regional inequality. In advanced democracies, the detrimental
effect of fiscal decentralization on regional equity may be reduced by various institutional factors, including,
of course, equalization transfer programs.
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2 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
The debate on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and regional inequality
dates back to Tiebout (1956) and Oates (1972), who justify decentralization policy as a way
to achieve economic efficiency in the allocation of resources in the public sector. Under the
assumption that public officials respond to the desires of their constituents, sub-national
governments in a decentralized economy are better able to match differing preferences across
jurisdictions. When taxpayers are mobile, gains in efficiency are enhanced because individuals can migrate sorting themselves out among the jurisdictions that best match their preferred
tax-expenditure package. However, enhanced efficiency under a decentralized framework is
only one of the widely accepted objectives that guide government policy; achieving greater
equality is another desired objective and one that may not go side by side with the gains in
efficiency associated with decentralization. A survey of the literature reveals that there are
at least several compelling mechanisms for fiscal decentralization to lead to greater regional
inequality; this is especially the case for countries like China at early stages of economic development and where decentralization policy has been implemented within weak institutional
frameworks.3
First, in the presence of inter-jurisdictional competition, unfettered fiscal decentralization is likely to lead to a concentration of economic resources in rich jurisdictions and thus
increase disparities across sub-national governments (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2003).
Several things may be at play here. First, due to the initial regional heterogeneity in institutional, economic and social endowments, by empowering local governments, decentralization
tends to reinforce the competitive advantages of rich regions, which results in these regions
competing and attracting more mobile and valuable resources, while the poor regions tend
3

There may be circumstances under which fiscal decentralization has the opposite effect on regional
inequality. For instance, as pointed out by Rodrı́guez-Pose and Ezcurra (2010), decentralization is likely
to enhance fiscal transparency and place central and local governments under pressure to equalize public
goods and services around the country, which eventually may contribute to lower levels of regional inequality.
Nevertheless, this argument appears to be weak in the Chinese context where the main focus of the central
government has been to foster strong fiscal and political incentives for local governments to promote local
economic development as opposed to any emphasis on equalizing public goods and services delivery.

4

to have less ability to attract investment and recruit talent (Prud’homme, 1995; Cai and
Treisman, 2005). Second, not unrelated, richer regions have greater capacity for matching local preferences with abundant resources, leading mobile factors to flow more easily to
these areas as opposed to the poorer regions. Third, richer regions can offer substantial tax
abatements and land write-downs to incoming businesses, while the poorer ones, shorter on
government revenues can hardly do the same. Given the vast heterogeneity in terms of social,
economic, and fiscal conditions across China’s provinces, those predictions fit neatly in the
Chinese context. Over the past several decades China has experienced a high concentration
of economic resources in the rich provinces (i.e., costal/eastern provinces), at the same time
the country has undergone an intense asymmetric inter-jurisdictional competition process.
It appears that fiscal decentralization in recent decades has not eased the problem of the
regional overconcentration of resources in some areas of the country but rather has tended
to reinforce the existing patterns (e.g., Zhao and Zhang, 1999; Zhang, 2006).
Second, by forcing regional governments to rely mostly on revenues raised from their
own jurisdictions, fiscal decentralization has weakened the central government’s role in redistributing income from rich to poor regions, resulting in higher regional inequality. In the
fiscal decentralization literature there is some consensus that the objective of income redistribution should be a central government responsibility for two main reasons: one is that
the benefits of redistribution spill over beyond provincial and local boundaries; second, redistribution policies of sub-national governments will be compromised by the in-migration of
poor families who are attracted by the higher benefits and the out-migration of rich families
trying to escape the redistributive taxes. Of course, this problem is anticipated to be weakened when the implementation of fiscal decentralization is accompanied by fiscal equalization
policies.
Third, from a political perspective, rich regions are likely to exert a greater influence
on central decision-making, thereby increasing their chance of being offered more resources
(Rodrı́guez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010). In many countries, though decentralization makes sub-
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national governments more financially independent through the assignment of tax powers
to the local authorities, generally the central government still tends to have a final say over
discretionary funds, interregional coordination, and even the pace and scope of decentralization. Richer regions with better financial resources and possibly greater political influence
can make the central government develop policies or allocate discretionary funds in favor of
rich areas. In China, richer regions are indeed likely to receive more sources due to their
political advantageous position. For one thing, in the context of China’s political structure,
the party secretary and the governor of a given province may exert a substantially different
influence on the central decision-making apparatus. Some rich, influential provinces, such as
Guangdong province, can have a greater say in Beijing as the party secretary of Guangdong
province is usually a member of the Central Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party,4
meaning that the top leader in Guangdong province can have a direct involvement in the
central government’s decision making process. This reciprocal accountability, as observed
by Shirk (1990), reveals that some local party leadership may have a greater say in affecting
the central government’s policy making as the central leadership needs support from local
governments. The leverage exerted by other local party leaders is substantially different.
Some poorer, lagging regions have far less influence in the central policy making process. As
an example, this asymmetry in political influence was made evident by the introduction of
the “tax rebates” as a major component of the fiscal transfer system introduced in the 1994
Tax-Sharing reform, which in effect rewarded the richer regions of China with substantial
additional funds.
From these various arguments above, we derive the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 Fiscal decentralization is positively associated with regional inequality in
China.
The above discussion provides valuable insights into the regional inequality effect of fiscal
decentralization; however, the discussion relies heavily on the assumption of the absence of
4

The 25-member Politburo is one of the most powerful decision-making bodies in China.
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an important supplementary policy under decentralized systems—fiscal equalization. Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that fiscal equalization exerts an important role in shaping the
final net impacts of fiscal decentralization and thus a more thorough investigation of fiscal
decentralization needs to be taken into consideration. Given the very nature of equalization
policy, we expect that the possible detrimental effects of fiscal decentralization on equality
will be mitigated with the presence of fiscal equalization [Hypothesis 2]. This outcome can be
anticipated for two reasons. First, fiscal equalization by redirecting resources from the richer
regions to the poorer regions should improve horizontal fiscal balances, leading to a more
level playing field for all jurisdictions (Oates, 1999). More specifically, by funding a nationwide standard of provision for public goods and services through an equalization program,
central governments make sure that richer regions do not have this type of advantage over
poorer regions in the inter-jurisdictional competition for business and other mobile factors.
At the same time, poorer regions are provided with ways to catch up with the richer ones
based on joint programs of the local authorities with the central government. Equalization
policy not only means that poorer regions will have more public resources for public goods
provision but also that poorer regions now may have a stronger capacity to work on suitable
solutions for local development.5 On the other hand, since equalization systems distribute
fiscal transfers to regions in a way that correlates inversely with their fiscal capacities, a
number of scholars have observed that fiscal equalization induces significant incentive effects on the taxing and expenditure policy of regional governments in a way that reduces
the extent of inter-jurisdictional competition among rich and poor regions, and so mitigates
the detrimental effect of fiscal decentralization on regional inequality (e.g., Boadway and
Flatters, 1982; Smart, 1998; Liu, 2014). This is because when a region attempts to attract
mobile factors from other regions by cutting tax rates or increasing public expenditure, it
5

Drawing on a political economy model, Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2008) also point out that equalization programs may improve local accountability through enabling voters to compare public good supplies
between regions thus keeping politicians more accountable. As fiscal equalization efforts usually aim to ensure the same standards for public services across regions, politicians will have to be more self-restrained and
be less rent-seeking; otherwise, poor public goods provision may make rational voters punish the incumbents.
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increases its own tax base relative to the national average, which simultaneously reduces the
region’s entitlement for higher grants.
Hypothesis 2 The positive effect of fiscal decentralization on enlarging regional inequality
is likely to be mitigated by fiscal equalization policies.
Finally, as we highlighted in the first section of the paper, all central government transfers
in China have to go through the provincial governments before reaching the various layers of
sub-provincial governments (prefectures, counties and townships); thus, provincial governments enjoy a substantial degree of discretion in designing their own equalization policies to
meet their diversified policy objectives. It is also this feature that is likely to generate large
variations in equalization efforts across provinces. This high degree of variation provides us
a good scenario to test Hypothesis 2 in the Chinese context.

3 Econometric Methodology, Measurement of Key Variables, and
Data
3.1 Econometric Specification
In this section we discuss the empirical strategy with the objective of testing the predictions that are explicitly summarized in Hypotheses 1 and 2. Specifically, to assess the
causal impacts of fiscal decentralization on intra-provincial inequality, we estimate a standard
two-way fixed effects model of the form,

Iit = α + βF Dit + γEQit + θF Dit ∗ EQit + Xit δ + ηi + ϑt + it

(1)

where i represents province and t denotes year. The dependent variable Iit is our measure of
intra-provincial inequality in the level of economic development based on county level data;
F Dit is the fiscal decentralization indicator of a province; EQit is a proxy of the equalization
8

effort conducted by the provincial government;6 and F Dit ∗ EQit is the interaction term
between the two variables. On the grounds of Hypotheses 1 and 2, we expect to find a
positive sign for coefficient β and a negative sign for coefficient θ. Furthermore, the model
includes province dummies (ηi ) to control for unobserved heterogeneity across provinces that
are constant over time and also year dummies (ϑt ) to control for year effects that affect all
provinces; it is an idiosyncratic error term.
As control variable Xit we seek to capture the general factors of significance in determining regional inequality based on the extant empirical literature. Several factors have been
identified as particularly important in explaining regional inequality in China. These include
real GDP per capita, the share of secondary sector in total GDP, the share of state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) outputs in total industrial output, trade openness, and the urbanization
rate.
Real GDP per capita serves as a proxy for the level of economic development of the
provinces; it is commonly agreed in the literature that economic development exerts a significant impact on spatial inequality, though the net effect of this variable is theoretically
unclear. For example, from the viewpoint of the new economic geography school, economic
growth has a tendency to be associated with agglomeration (economies), which eventually
leads to an uneven spatial development (Krugman, 1998; Fujita and Thisse, 2002); on the
other hand, it is suggested that advances in economic development may endow the regions
with a larger scope for redistributive politics through transmission channels besides interregional grants and transfers (Lessmann, 2009). The share of the secondary sector in total
GDP and the share of SOEs outputs in total industrial output are employed to capture the
impacts of economic structure on the patterns of regional development within provinces.
Over the years, a key source of regional inequality in China has been the location-biased
national industrialization strategy (particularly in the case of the heavy-industry development strategy), and restrictive inter-regional migration policies (e.g., the Huhou system),
6

See the next subsection for detailed definitions on the intra-provincial inequality, fiscal decentralization
indicator, and equalization effort index.
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which lead to an uneven spatial distribution of industrialization outcomes (see Tsui, 1991;
Kanbur and Zhang, 2005). Trade openness has been consistently found to be one of the
major contributors of China’s regional inequality, reflecting the dramatic changes in regional
comparative advantage and industry clustering patterns as a result of trade liberalization
(e.g., Kanbur and Zhang, 2005; Fan et al., 2011). In view of this, we include trade openness, measured as the ratio of total trade (exports and imports) to GDP at the provincial
level, to control for this effect. Lastly, the rural-urban gap has persistently accounted for a
large share of regional inequality in China (e.g., Tsui, 1993; Kanbur and Zhang, 1999, 2005;
Sicular et al., 2007), which, to a large extent has been rooted in the institutional legacies of
socialism which gave rise to a series of urban-biased social and economic policies. Thus, the
urbanization level, measured as the share of urban population in the total province population, is expected to reduce the rural-urban gap and contribute to a lower level of regional
inequality within the provinces.

3.2 Measures of Key Variables
Below, we explain in further detail the measurements of our key variables of interest:
intra-provincial inequality, fiscal decentralization, and equalization effort of provincial governments.

3.2.1 Intra-provincial inequality
As we have stressed in the introduction, our primary focus is on the economic aspect of
disparities within provinces; thus, we follow the conventional empirical literature on regional
inequality (e.g., Williamson, 1965; Petrakos et al., 2005; Rodrı́guez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010)
to define our dependent variable, intra-provincial inequality, as the population-weighted
coefficient of variation of per capita GDP of the counties within the province, which takes
the following form,

10

qP
ni
Iit =

j=1

pjt (yjt − µit )2
µit

(2)

where yjt and pjt are the per capita GDP and population share of county j in province i for
year t, respectively;7 ni is the total number of counties in province i; µit is the populationP i
weighed average of per capita GDP in province i for year t, i.e., µit = nj=1
pjt yjt . This
measure of dispersion presents several appealing features. First, it is independent of the
number of regions considered; second, it satisfies the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle in the
sense that an arithmetical transfer from the rich to the poor regions reduces inequality
(Cowell, 2011); and third, by taking into account the different weights in population across
counties, this measure of dispersion is independent of scale and population size.

3.2.2 Fiscal decentralization indicators
Measuring the extent of fiscal decentralization has been long debated in both theoretical
work and empirical studies. This has been the case largely because fiscal decentralization
unfolds along several dimensions and at different paces; thus no single indicator is able to
adequately capture the full picture of the process and ideally that process should be measured separately for each of the dimensions (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2003; Stegarescu,
2005). Nevertheless, this issue can be at least partially overcome by considering alternative
indicators that reflect different aspects of the decentralization process (Liu et al., 2013).
For this reason, we measure the degree of fiscal decentralization in the provinces by simultaneously considering expenditure decentralization and revenue decentralization. Of these
two indicators, expenditure decentralization, defined as the local share of total government
expenditure, has been the most widely used indicator in the literature (e.g., Oates, 1985;
7

Similar to other relevant studies that have used Chinese county data (e.g., Zhang, 2006; Uchimura
and Jütting, 2009), our basic unit for calculating intra-provincial inequality is county j, which does not
include the city district (“qu”), as the latter differs significantly from the former in many aspects including
administrative, economic, and fiscal aspects. In this regard it has been highlighted in the literature that
when calculating regional inequality, it is necessary to use a territorial classification that creates relatively
homogenous regions (Lessmann, 2009).
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Davoodi and Zou, 1998; de Mello, 2000) as it captures the degree of local governments’
expenditure responsibilities in the public sector, quantifying who does what. Beyond these
arguments, there is even a stronger reason to measure decentralization from the expenditure
side rather than the revenue side in the Chinese context. This is due to the fact that fiscal
revenues in China are reallocated between the central and local governments in a complex
web of flows (e.g., revenue sharing, rebates and transfers, etc.) and local governments have
virtually no authority in either determining their tax rates or tax bases (Qiao et al., 2008;
Wu and Wang, 2013).8 Given this, we expect to find a stronger effect of decentralization
from the expenditure side measurement.
While most of the existing empirical studies on fiscal decentralization in China have relied on data at the center-province level (e.g., Zhang and Zou, 1998; Jin and Zou, 2005; Qiao
et al., 2008), we utilize county data to measure fiscal decentralization at the province-local
level. This is a more accurate measure of the degree of decentralization at the province
level because provincial governments in China enjoy almost full discretion in designing their
decentralization policy for local governments within their borders.9 In addition, our measurement of fiscal decentralization at the sub-provincial level fits much better in our context,
as our interest is to explain the county variations in the level of economic development within
provinces. More specifically, following and extending Wu and Wang (2013), we define (1)
expenditure decentralization as the share of sub-provincial expenditure (i.e., the aggregation
of prefectural, county and township public expenditures) in total expenditure of the province
and (2) revenue decentralization as the share of sub-provincial revenue (i.e., the aggregation
of prefectural, county and township revenue) in total revenue of the province.

8

In contrast, local governments in China have significant levels of autonomy and discretion on the
expenditure side of the budget.
9
Uchimura and Jütting (2009) and Wu and Wang (2013) are notable exceptions in that they also measure
fiscal decentralization at the sub-provincial level in China.
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3.2.3 Equalization effort
Equalization effort is a relative concept that reflects the extent of changes in the distribution of fiscal resource within provinces with and without the presence of equalization
transfers from provincial governments. Following this concept and drawing on the relevant
work by Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2008), we measure equalization effort of provincial
governments as the percentage change of intra-provincial disparities in fiscal revenues before
and after taking into account the equalization transfers received by county governments.
More specifically, the measure takes the following form,

EQit =

fitb − fita
fitb

(3)

where fitb is the population-weighted coefficient of variation of own source revenue in province
i for year t, and it is calculated according to a formula similar to equation (2) on the basis of
county-level data; fita is the corresponding population-weighted coefficient of variation of total
revenue taking into account the equalization transfers received by county governments in
province i for year t. Being part of the decentralization design in the provinces, fiscal transfers
at the sub-provincial level are at the discretion of provincial governments. Therefore, a larger
value of EQit indicates higher equalization efforts being pursued by provincial governments,
which in turn affects the final performance of the decentralization policy in the provinces.
It is worth noting here that intergovernmental fiscal transfers in China are mainly categorized into three groups: tax rebates, equalization transfers, and ad hoc transfers. The one
we take into account in the calculation of the “after” fiscal disparities (i.e., fita ) is the exact
group of equalization transfers, which has been widely believed to precisely reflect the actual
equalization intention of upper-level governments (e.g., Zhang and Martinez-Vazquez, 2003;
Huang and Chen, 2012; Liu et al., Forthcoming).10 Nevertheless, as robustness checks we
10

The tax rebate was a compromised outcome to smooth the implementation of the Tax-Sharing reform
in 1994. Specifically, the tax rebate was introduced to guarantee the vested interests of richer provincial
governments prior to the 1994 reform. Its essence was to return to the provinces the amounts of VAT,
consumption taxes and income taxes that otherwise would have gone to these provinces under the old system.
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present in section 5, we also consider the case where the total amounts of fiscal transfers are
taken into account.

3.3 Data
The panel dataset we use for the quantitative analysis covers 26 provinces in China for
the years 1995-2009. Similar to the relevant work by Uchimura and Jütting (2009) in using
county data, we exclude the four province-level municipalities, Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai,
and Chongqing for the following two reasons: first, the legal status of counties (and also districts) in these municipalities is non-comparable to the counties in other provinces since they
may differ dramatically in terms of administrative and fiscal status; second, these municipalities only have a very limited number of counties, which weakens their representativeness
in calculating the intra-provincial inequality.11 Since the formal intergovernmental fiscal
transfers system was only in place in 1995,12 we use year 1995 as the starting period in
our analysis; the end year of the panel dataset, 2009, is the last year that fiscal data at
the county level were released. Finally, Tibet is also excluded from the sample due to data
unavailability.
County-level data used for the calculations of the key variables discussed in the previous subsection are taken from the Prefecture, City, and County Public Finance Statistics
(Quanguo Dishixian Caizheng Tongji Ziliao, 1996-2010), which provides the most detailed
and disaggregated data on subnational public finances and some basic economic and socioeconomic variables (such as GDP and population). It is also noted that population data
at the county level for year 2001 and onward are complemented from the China Statistical
Yearbook for Regional Economy (Zhongguo Quyu Jingji Tongji Nianjian, 2002-2010) as they
By design the tax rebates did not perform any equalization role. The ad hoc transfers typically involve
the central government response to high-priority emergencies or are generally associated with particular
programmatic objectives; this type of transfer is usually endowed with strong bargaining features. See
Zhang and Martinez-Vazquez (2003) for a detailed discussion on the fiscal transfers system in China, and
Huang and Chen (2012) and Liu et al. (Forthcoming) for analyses of its equalization effects.
11
For example, Shanghai has only one county and Beijing has only two.
12
The Tax-Sharing system reform was implemented in year 1994.
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are no longer reported in the previous documents. All other data at the provincial-level are
collected from various issues of the China Statistical Yearbook and the China Compendium of
Statistics 1949-2008. Table A1 in the Appendix provides a detailed description and sources
of all the variables, while their summary statistics are reported in Table 1.

4 Empirical Findings
4.1 Baseline Results
Table 2 presents the estimation results for our baseline model (1). All specifications
are estimated using a two-way fixed effects model, along with controlling for the major
explanatory variables and correcting for robust standard errors. Overall, the baseline model
has a R-squared value around 0.63, indicating that 63% of the variation of intra-provincial
inequality is explained in our model.
To begin with, we examine the effect of fiscal decentralization on intra-provincial inequality assuming no interaction effect from the equalization effort of provincial governments.
Columns (1) and (2) report the corresponding results with alternatively considering expenditure decentralization and revenue decentralization as the key variable of interest. As shown,
the coefficient of expenditure decentralization (i.e., column (1)) is positive and statistically
significant at 5% level, supporting Hypothesis 1 that an increase of fiscal decentralization
leads to larger intra-provincial inequality. Quantitatively, a one-percentage point increase
in the measure of expenditure decentralization increases intra-provincial inequality by 0.008
points; in other words, a province with the sample average value of expenditure decentralization (i.e., 73.7%) will have a 0.59 points increase in its intra-provincial disparity—a value
that is equivalent to 89.8% of the sample average value of intra-provincial inequality across
provinces and years. Turning to the coefficient of revenue decentralization (column (2)), it
confirms the previous finding that fiscal decentralization is positively associated with intraprovincial inequality, though the coefficient is only statistically significant at the margin.
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In addition, the magnitudes of the coefficients also reveal that the quantitative impacts of
fiscal decentralization tend to be smaller when it is measured from the revenue side, which in
turn is consistent with the conventional wisdom that expenditure decentralization appears
to be a more accurate and practically more meaningful measure of decentralization in China.
Overall, we find supportive evidence for Hypothesis 1 in suggesting a positive relationship
between fiscal decentralization and intra-provincial inequality in economic development.
However, in the above analysis, the effect of fiscal decentralization may not be sufficiently
captured. The reason is that, as highlighted in Hypothesis 2, although an increase in fiscal
decentralization may give rise to an increase in intra-provincial inequality, its final effect may
also depend on how equalized the distribution of fiscal resource is within the provinces. For
instance, even if two provinces may have the same share of sub-provincial government expenditure in total expenditure of the province, the possible detrimental effects of one province’s
decentralization policy on regional inequality within the province may be less severe than in
the other province. This is true because out of the same share of sub-provincial expenditure
the former may have a more equalized distribution of expenditure among counties (due to
the higher equalization effort of provincial government), which in turn contributes to a more
balanced regional development within the province. Given this, to address the effect of fiscal
decentralization on intra-provincial inequality more precisely and also to test Hypothesis 2,
we take into account the interaction effect between fiscal decentralization and equalization
effort of provincial governments. This interaction term allows us to evaluate how equalization efforts by provincial governments influence the effects of fiscal decentralization. The
results are shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2. The estimated coefficients of both fiscal
decentralization indicators remain positive and statistically significant, while the coefficients
of the interaction term are significantly negative. This confirms Hypothesis 2 in the sense
that the partial effect of fiscal decentralization on intra-provincial inequality is decreasing
with the level of equalization effort exercised by the provincial government.
Regarding the other variables included in the model, the equalization effort variable (in
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levels) in the specifications without adding an interaction term (i.e., columns (1) and (2))
has a negative coefficient but is only statistically significant at the margin. It becomes
positive and significant once the interaction is added; however, considering together with the
negative and significant coefficient of the interaction term (i.e., columns (3) and (4)), the net
partial effect of equalization effort depends on the level of fiscal equalization. Nevertheless,
evaluating at the sample mean value of any of the two fiscal decentralization indicators, the
net partial effect of equalization effort is always negative and significant,13 suggesting that,
on average, a higher level of equalization effort by provincial governments is associated with
a lower level of intra-provincial economic disparities. All other control variables in general
have statistically significant coefficients and the results are mostly consistent with what we
predicted. Real GDP per capita along with the two measures of economic structure, the share
of secondary industry in total GDP and the share of SOEs outputs in total industrial output,
have positive and significant coefficients, indicating that the provincial economic development
and industrialization process tend to enlarge regional inequality within provinces. Consistent
with previous studies, urbanization is found to be an effective element in reducing intraprovincial inequality in China, while trade openness contributes to larger regional inequality
within provinces, though this effect tends to be statistically significant only at the margins
in some specifications.

4.2 Instrumental Variable
A potential concern is that the endogeneity of fiscal decentralization may bias our estimates in Table 2. Endogeneity may be present because the deterioration of intra-provincial
inequality may lead to a strong demand for centralization and so lower the level of fiscal
decentralization and increase equalization efforts within provinces. A more subtle argument
for the existence of the endogeneity of fiscal decentralization is implied by the findings of
Sacchi and Salotti (2014). These authors find evidence that high regional economic dispari13

For example, looking at column (3) in Table 2, the net partial effect of equalization effort is, 2.2120.033*(mean of expenditure decentralization indicator)=2.212-0.033*73.7=-0.220.
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ties are associated with lower levels of fiscal decentralization in OECD countries for the years
1981-2005.
Previous studies on the impacts of fiscal decentralization have also acknowledged the
potential endogeneity bias in their estimates, though they do not explicitly control for it14 —
to a large extent due to small sample sizes and the lack of good instruments (e.g., Zhang
and Zou, 1998; Xie et al., 1999; Lin and Liu, 2000; Jin et al., 2005; Qiao et al., 2008). In this
subsection, we account for the potential endogeneity bias by using an instrumental approach.
Facing the same difficulty in previous studies of finding good external instruments, we follow
the traditional practice of using the first and second lagged values of fiscal decentralization
and equalization effort as instruments. The validity of these instruments is justified by the
fact that while the decentralization policy in a province is likely to be consistent over a short
period of time, intra-provincial inequality in the later year should not affect provinces’ choice
of decentralization policy in the preceding years in a significant way.
Table 3 documents the results we obtain utilizing the instrumental method. The Ftest statistics from the first stage regression and the over-identifying restriction tests are
noted at the bottom of the table. As shown, the Cragg-Donald F-statistics are reasonably
large and statistically significant, indicating the instruments are good predictors of the fiscal
decentralization and equalization effort variables; the p-values of the Hansen J statistics
suggest that we cannot reject the hypothesis of no correlation between the instruments and
the error term in the regressions. Comparing the results in Tables 3 and 2 confirms our earlier
findings: fiscal decentralization leads to larger regional inequality within provinces while
equalization efforts by provincial governments help reduce the detrimental effects of fiscal
decentralization on regional equality, with the parameter estimates in Table 3 being larger
than those in Table 2, confirming our expectations that taking endogeneity into account
would lead to higher estimated inequality impacts.

14

Fisman and Gatti (2002) and Iimi (2005) are the two exceptions in the literature.
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5 Robustness Checks
In order to test for the robustness of the main results, we conduct sensitivity analyses
along three dimensions: adding more control variables, using alternative measures of intraprovincial inequality, and using alternative measures of equalization effort by provincial
governments. In all robustness checks, we find results from the completed specifications
equivalent to those in columns (3) and (4) of Tables 2 and 3 that include the interaction
variable.

5.1 Additional Control Variables
Beyond the most common discussed factors that we already included as control variables,
there are possibly some other variables including human capital and inflation that may also
explain the pattern of regional inequality (e.g., Fleisher et al., 2010; Kyriacou et al., 2013).
In addition, by changing the income taxes (i.e., personal and corporate income taxes) from
local source taxes to shared taxes, the 2002 income tax reform in China significantly affected
the revenue assignments among different levels of governments, which eventually may have
affected the pattern of regional development. We control for these three additional variables
to check the robustness of our results. Following the literature, human capital is defined
as the average years of schooling in the provinces;15 inflation is measured as the annual
percentage change in the consumer price index; and the 2002 income tax reform is captured
by a dummy variable equaling 1 for the years after 2002 (0 otherwise).
Table 4 reports the new estimated results. As shown, the inclusion of these additional
explanatory variables does not alter the parameter estimates or conclusions regarding the
effects of fiscal decentralization on intra-provincial inequality. In all cases with and without
controlling for endogeneity, expenditure and revenue decentralization remain positive and
significant, while the interaction term between fiscal decentralization and equalization effort
15

Data on human capital is derived from Chen et al. (2004) for the year before 2001 and it is augmented
by the authors for the years after 2001.
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remain negative and significant. Both human capital and inflation appear to enlarge regional
inequality within provinces, although they are in general statistically insignificant. The 2002
income tax reform tends to significantly reduce intra-provincial inequality—in a broad sense,
confirming our expectation that the centralization of revenues should help reduce regional
inequality.

5.2 Alternative Measure of Regional inequality
Our second round of checking the robustness of our results consists of using alternative
known measures of regional inequality. This may be important because different measures of
inequality rely on varied approaches to the aggregation of information contained in the distribution, which in turn may lead to different orderings of the distribution analyzed (Ezcurra
and Pascual, 2008; Rodrı́guez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010). For this reason, we re-calculate the
measures of intra-provincial inequality and equalization effort using two other measures of
inequality that have been widely used in the literature on personal income distribution and in
the study of regional inequality (e.g., Terrasi, 1999; Ezcurra and Pascual, 2008; Rodrı́guezPose and Ezcurra, 2010): They are the Gini coefficient and the Theil index. These two
indices can be calculated as follows, respectively,
ni X
ni
1 X
pjt pkt |yjt − ykt |
Git =
2µit j=1 k=1

(4)

and

Tit =

ni
X
j=1

pjt

yjt
yjt
log( )
µit
µit

(5)

where both j and k denote counties; and the rest of the notation is the same in equation
(2). Note that these two indices also satisfy the requirements that they are independent
of the number of regions considered, the scale and population size of the regions, and the
Pigou-Dalton transfer principle.
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Tables 5 and 6 summarize the results corresponding to the alternative measures of intraprovincial inequality and equalization effort of provincial governments using the Gini coefficient and the Theil index. The results again suggest that greater levels of expenditure and
revenue decentralization lead to larger regional inequality within provinces, whereas greater
equalization efforts by provincial governments help offset the detrimental effects of fiscal
decentralization on regional inequality.16 Quantitatively, it would appear that the effect of
fiscal decentralization on intra-provincial inequality becomes smaller when these alternative
measures of inequality are adopted; however, this is, in large part, due to an overall smaller
value of intra-provincial inequality measured by these indices (see Table 1).

5.3 Alternative Measure of Equalization Effort
Lastly, it is noted earlier that in the calculation of equalization effort of provincial governments, we have only considered the equalization transfers component, which, from a
normative perspective, appears to be the best way to capture the equalization intention of
provincial governments. Nevertheless, it also seems to be warranted, as further robustness
checks, to consider the case where the total amount of fiscal transfers is used in the calculation of the equalization effort; due to the bargaining features of the transfers system, some
other components of transfers (for example, the ad hoc transfers) may also result in a certain
degree of equalization effects (e.g., Huang and Chen, 2012; Liu et al., Forthcoming).
To investigate this, we re-calculate the equalization effort indicator based on the distribution of total fiscal transfers within provinces and re-calculate equation (2). The results
are presented in Table 7. The results are quite comparable to those in Tables 2 and 3 where
we do and do not control for endogeneity, confirming our conclusions on the roles of fiscal
decentralization and fiscal equalization. The magnitudes of the estimated coefficients for
fiscal equalization are a bit smaller. This may be an indication that the other components of
16

Although the coefficient of revenue decentralization in column (4) of Table 5 appears to be not statistically significant, its joint test with the interaction term is statistically significant at the 10% significance
level.
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the transfer system may not be as equalizing as our primary measure of equalization effort
based on equalization transfers only.

6 Conclusions
The link between fiscal decentralization and regional inequality has long been debated
in the literature. The empirical evidence has been mixed even when the studies have only
focused on the same group of countries (e.g., OECD countries). After carefully assessing this
issue in the Chinese institutional context, we hypothesize that fiscal decentralization is likely
to result in larger regional inequality, while the equalization effort exercised by provincial
governments is likely to work as an effective tool in correcting some of the detrimental effects
of fiscal decentralization. These two hypotheses are tested by employing county-level panel
data, where fiscal decentralization, equalization and regional inequality are all measured at
the sub-provincial level. Our results provide strong support to the two hypotheses. These
results are also shown to be robust across different regression methods, alternative measures of intra-provincial inequality, and alternative measures of fiscal decentralization and
equalization efforts by provincial governments.
In light of the fact that a large part of regional inequality in China arises from intraprovincial inequality, it is surprising to see that these two factors (fiscal decentralization and
equalization efforts) contributing to this type of inequality have been so rarely investigated
in the literature. Thus, our study contributes to a better understanding of the general
determinants of intra-provincial inequality and so the overall regional inequality in China,
with a particular emphasis on the role played by the fiscal decentralization policies pursued
by provincial governments.
From a policy perspective, the main results of this study provide valuable insights for how
to reduce regional inequality within provinces, if that is the policy objective of the central
government or provincial governments.
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First, in China the subnational government share in public expenditures is significantly
larger than is the case even in the most decentralized countries. This is largely due to the
fact that many social expenditure responsibilities in public welfare, including unemployment
compensation and pensions, have been long assigned to subnational governments, especially
at the lowest level (Martinez-Vazquez and Qiao, 2011). Therefore there is plenty of scope for
China’s central government to reassign and centralize those expenditure responsibilities that
currently are clearly wrongly assigned since expenditures on social welfare and unemployment
compensation should be the domain of the central government. As we have seen in this paper,
this type of policy would contribute significantly towards regional convergence in China.
The second set of findings in this paper reinforces the traditional wisdom highlighting
the importance of maintaining an effective equalization program for the successful implementation of a decentralized system. The question remains open on whether provincial
governments are currently sufficiently involved in implementing equalization programs pursuing more balanced regional development and more equal access to public services for their
residents. Greater equalization efforts at the provincial level will require further increasing
the overall pool of funds dedicated to equalization and making this increased funding more
stable and predictable by adopting an explicit funding rule for the available pool of funds.
Because provincial governments still have considerable discretion in setting these and other
forms of fiscal interactions with their subordinate governments, the central authorities need
to weigh the need for introducing minimum performance standards in matters of equalization
at the provincial level.
There is more that central authorities can do to increase regional convergence. As Shankar
and Shah (2003) have pointed out, past interventionist policies by central governments aiming to promote regional development often have resulted in regional divergence. In the
Chinese case, during the 1980s and early 1990s removing barriers to factor mobility and the
opening of economic development zones were essential to economic prosperity and greater
inequality across the regions. Further liberalization of factor mobility, including the removal
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of the internal migration (e.g., Hukou) restrictions, should further contribute to regional convergence. But in fact when it comes to the minimum standards of basic services people are
demanding in their regions, the Chinese institutional context in recent years has proved that
a proactive approach, to some extent using interventionist policies, has been quite instrumental in reducing regional inequality: through an improved centrally orchestrated equalization
effort less developed regions are being equipped with improved fiscal capacity, although this
effort may still be falling short (Liu et al., Forthcoming), calling for substantially increased
central equalization transfers.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

wcv gdppc
wgini gdppc
wtheil gdppc
Expenditure decentralization
Revenue decentralization
Equalization effort 1
Equalization effort 2
Equalization effort 3
Equalization effort 4
GDP per capita, log
Share of SOEs outputs
Share of secondary sector
Urbanization
Openness
Schooling
Inflation
Tax reform 2002

0.66
0.31
0.18
73.68
80.4
0.32
0.32
0.43
0.34
1.88
0.54
0.44
0.37
0.22
7.52
3.11
0.53

0.25
0.08
0.11
8.81
8.58
0.21
0.2
0.24
0.21
0.62
0.21
0.07
0.12
0.29
0.82
4.8
0.5
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Min

Max

Obs

0.2
1.79
0.11 0.55
0.02
0.7
46.25 89.23
55.2 99.08
-0.02 0.73
-0.08 0.73
-0.1
0.9
-0.31 0.78
0.4
3.38
0.11 0.95
0.2
0.58
0.16 0.79
0.03 1.58
4.69 9.24
-3.2
21.4
0
1

390
390
390
390
390
390
390
390
390
390
390
390
380
390
390
390
390

Table 2: Main Results: Fixed Effects Estimation
(1)
Expenditure decentralization

0.008**
(2.251)

Revenue decentralization
Equalization effort 1
Expenditure decentralization
× Equalization effort 1
Revenue decentralization
× Equalization effort 1
GDP per capita, log
Share of SOEs outputs
Share of secondary sector
Urbanization
Openness
Constant

Province fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Observations
R-squared

(2)

-0.173
(-1.352)

(3)

(4)

0.021***
(3.993)
0.003
(1.305)
-0.159
(-1.281)

0.447**
(2.285)
0.396**
(2.397)
1.063**
(2.127)
-0.172**
(-2.321)
0.096
(1.123)
-1.533***
(-3.378)

0.528***
(2.839)
0.362**
(2.276)
1.001**
(2.074)
-0.155**
(-2.197)
0.107
(1.291)
-1.222***
(-3.231)

Yes
Yes
380
0.624

Yes
Yes
380
0.621

2.212***
(3.664)
-0.033***
(-4.081)

-0.026***
(-4.720)
0.565*** 0.597***
(3.251)
(3.495)
0.262
0.216
(1.608)
(1.361)
0.495
1.126**
(1.169)
(2.355)
-0.106
-0.137**
(-1.486)
(-1.977)
0.112
0.186**
(1.295)
(2.128)
-2.543*** -2.108***
(-4.742)
(-4.782)
Yes
Yes
380
0.649

Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses; ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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0.010***
(3.624)
1.819***
(4.336)

Yes
Yes
380
0.640

Table 3: Main Results: Fixed Effects with IVs Estimation
(1)
Expenditure decentralization

0.016**
(2.239)

Revenue decentralization
Equalization effort 1
Expenditure decentralization
× Equalization effort 1
Revenue decentralization
× Equalization effort 1
GDP per capita, log
Share of SOEs outputs
Share of secondary sector
Urbanization
Openness
Constant

Province fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Observations
R-squared
Cragg-Donald F Statistic
Hansen J statistic (p-value)

(2)

-0.405*
(-1.701)

(3)

(4)

0.036***
(3.255)
0.002
(0.629)
-0.355
(-1.535)

0.639***
(4.268)
0.705***
(4.464)
0.947*
(1.855)
-0.169*
(-1.913)
0.046
(0.506)
-2.408***
(-4.099)

0.768***
(6.025)
0.611***
(3.869)
0.912*
(1.889)
-0.109
(-1.443)
0.064
(0.697)
-1.819***
(-3.480)

Yes
Yes
332
0.641
24.88
0.341

Yes
Yes
332
0.644
64.74
0.445

2.107**
(2.399)
-0.035***
(-3.202)

-0.028***
(-3.728)
0.683*** 0.822***
(4.863)
(6.743)
0.593*** 0.422***
(4.080)
(2.937)
0.455
1.012**
(1.029)
(2.109)
-0.129
-0.104
(-1.488)
(-1.396)
0.073
0.141
(0.792)
(1.458)
-3.633*** -2.477***
(-4.579)
(-4.249)
Yes
Yes
332
0.655
16.55
0.358

Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses; ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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0.011**
(2.565)
1.828***
(3.271)

Yes
Yes
332
0.657
41.47
0.818

Table 4: Robustness Checks: Additional Control Variables
Fixed Effects
(1)
(2)
Expenditure decentralization

0.021***
(4.001)

Revenue decentralization
Equalization effort 1
Expenditure decentralization
× Equalization effort 1
Revenue decentralization
× Equalization effort 1
GDP per capita, log
Share of SOEs outputs
Share of secondary sector
Urbanization
Openness
Tax reform 2002
Schooling
Inflation
Constant

Province fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Observations
R-squared
Cragg-Donald F Statistic
Hansen J statistic (p-value)

2.168***
(3.673)
-0.032***
(-4.079)

0.035***
(3.417)
0.010***
(3.587)
1.823***
(4.337)

-0.026***
(-4.684)
0.570*** 0.584***
(3.147)
(3.341)
0.253
0.170
(1.525)
(1.031)
0.481
1.069**
(1.135)
(2.302)
-0.118
-0.146**
(-1.622)
(-2.023)
0.121
0.201**
(1.387)
(2.290)
-0.675*** -0.805***
(-3.130)
(-3.726)
0.019
0.057
(0.571)
(1.620)
0.006
0.005
(0.676)
(0.575)
-2.761*** -2.522***
(-4.435)
(-4.585)
Yes
Yes
380
0.650
.
.

Fixed Effects+IVs
(3)
(4)

Yes
Yes
380
0.642
.
.

2.028**
(2.480)
-0.034***
(-3.275)

-0.028***
(-3.693)
0.681*** 0.808***
(4.570)
(6.239)
0.583***
0.376**
(4.028)
(2.502)
0.451
0.962**
(1.009)
(2.066)
-0.130
-0.103
(-1.505)
(-1.384)
0.074
0.149
(0.799)
(1.544)
-0.588*** -0.676***
(-4.675)
(-5.266)
0.015
0.047
(0.407)
(1.270)
0.003
0.006
(0.284)
(0.514)
-3.111*** -2.116***
(-3.892)
(-3.369)
Yes
Yes
332
0.656
16.17
0.336

Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses; ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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0.010**
(2.516)
1.831***
(3.285)

Yes
Yes
332
0.660
39.23
0.848

Table 5: Robustness Checks: Gini Measure of Regional Inequality
Fixed Effects
(1)
(2)
Expenditure decentralization

0.005***
(3.846)

Revenue decentralization
Equalization effort 2
Expenditure decentralization
× Equalization effort 2
Revenue decentralization
× Equalization effort 2
GDP per capita, log
Share of SOEs outputs
Share of secondary sector
Urbanization
Openness
Constant

Province fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Observations
R-squared
Cragg-Donald F Statistic
Hansen J statistic (p-value)

0.605***
(4.001)
-0.009***
(-4.299)

Fixed Effects+IVs
(3)
(4)
0.008***
(4.027)

0.003***
(2.872)
0.479***
(3.533)

0.530***
(3.095)
-0.008***
(-3.616)

0.001
(0.711)
0.282*
(1.885)

0.165***
(3.203)
0.040
(0.772)
0.185
(1.524)
-0.032
(-1.373)
0.041
(1.467)
-0.545***
(-3.915)

-0.006***
(-3.799)
0.168***
(3.339)
0.026
(0.492)
0.354***
(2.645)
-0.045**
(-2.040)
0.062**
(2.253)
-0.450***
(-3.612)

0.210***
(6.683)
0.076
(1.631)
0.128
(1.188)
-0.034
(-1.520)
0.064***
(2.663)
-0.793***
(-4.896)

-0.004**
(-2.027)
0.231***
(7.949)
0.037
(0.738)
0.251**
(2.096)
-0.023
(-1.151)
0.085***
(3.182)
-0.371***
(-2.720)

Yes
Yes
380
0.746
.
.

Yes
Yes
380
0.735
.
.

Yes
Yes
332
0.785
16.24
0.321

Yes
Yes
332
0.780
52.29
0.768

Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses; ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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Table 6: Robustness Checks: Theil Index Measure of Regional Inequality
Fixed Effects
(1)
(2)
Expenditure decentralization

0.008***
(3.061)

Revenue decentralization
Equalization effort 3
Expenditure decentralization
× Equalization effort 3
Revenue decentralization
× Equalization effort 3
GDP per capita, log
Share of SOEs outputs
Share of secondary sector
Urbanization
Openness
Constant

Province fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Observations
R-squared
Cragg-Donald F Statistic
Hansen J statistic (p-value)

0.562***
(2.619)
-0.008***
(-2.955)

Fixed Effects+IVs
(3)
(4)
0.014**
(2.568)

0.004***
(3.007)
0.615***
(3.760)

0.212**
(2.574)
0.120
(1.577)
0.494**
(2.381)
-0.052
(-1.637)
0.062
(1.613)
-1.163***
(-4.734)

-0.008***
(-4.220)
0.238***
(3.010)
0.072
(0.987)
0.640***
(2.891)
-0.044
(-1.459)
0.093**
(2.345)
-1.005***
(-5.384)

Yes
Yes
380
0.625
.
.

Yes
Yes
380
0.624
.
.

0.610
(1.611)
-0.010**
(-2.271)

-0.009***
(-3.000)
0.286*** 0.344***
(4.279)
(6.689)
0.222***
0.116*
(3.212)
(1.804)
0.427**
0.555**
(2.058)
(2.550)
-0.051
-0.019
(-1.353)
(-0.574)
0.072**
0.112***
(2.009)
(2.663)
-1.614*** -1.038***
(-4.147)
(-4.742)
Yes
Yes
332
0.635
14.97
0.142

Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses; ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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0.003*
(1.781)
0.619**
(2.556)

Yes
Yes
332
0.649
32.01
0.637

Table 7: Robustness Checks: Alternative Measure of Equalization Effort
Fixed Effects
(1)
(2)
Expenditure decentralization

0.018***
(3.498)

Revenue decentralization
Equalization effort 1
Expenditure decentralization
× Equalization effort 1
Revenue decentralization
× Equalization effort 1
GDP per capita, log
Share of SOEs outputs
Share of secondary sector
Urbanization
Openness
Constant

Province fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Observations
R-squared
Cragg-Donald F Statistic
Hansen J statistic (p-value)

1.966***
(3.178)
-0.028***
(-3.247)

Fixed Effects+IVs
(3)
(4)
0.034***
(2.620)

0.009***
(3.149)
1.570***
(4.005)

0.567***
(3.238)
0.293*
(1.838)
0.669
(1.541)
-0.128*
(-1.749)
0.125
(1.475)
-2.317***
(-4.287)

-0.021***
(-3.991)
0.551***
(3.264)
0.285*
(1.856)
1.106**
(2.345)
-0.147**
(-2.060)
0.213**
(2.458)
-1.917***
(-4.500)

Yes
Yes
380
0.636
.
.

Yes
Yes
380
0.633
.
.

2.620**
(2.033)
-0.043**
(-2.168)

-0.021***
(-2.762)
0.758*** 0.764***
(5.078)
(6.311)
0.499*** 0.479***
(3.374)
(3.370)
0.375
0.974**
(0.750)
(2.040)
-0.092
-0.102
(-1.099)
(-1.343)
0.031
0.135
(0.309)
(1.381)
-3.591*** -2.235***
(-3.904)
(-3.969)
Yes
Yes
332
0.641
16.12
0.442

Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses; ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.

35

0.009**
(2.065)
1.317***
(2.619)

Yes
Yes
332
0.654
24.76
0.344

Appendix
Table A1: Description of Variables and Sources
Variable
wcv gdppc

Definition
Population-weighted coefficient of variation of per capita
county GDP

wgini gdppc

Population-weighted Gini coefficient of per capita county
GDP
Population-weighted Theil index of per capita county GDP

wtheil gdppc
Expenditure decentralization

GDP per capita, log
Share of SOEs outputs
Share of secondary sector

Sub-provincial expenditure as a share of total expenditure
of the province
Sub-provincial revenue as a share of total revenue of the
province
Percentage change of intra-provincial inequality in fiscal
revenue before and after taking into account the equalization transfers received; based on C.V. measure
Percentage change of intra-provincial inequality in fiscal
revenue before and after taking into account the equalization transfers received; based on Gini coefficient measure
Percentage change of intra-provincial inequality in fiscal
revenue before and after taking into account the equalization transfers received; based on Theil index measure
Percentage change of intra-provincial inequality in fiscal
revenue before and after taking into account the total transfers received; based on C.V. measure
Real GDP per capita, log
The share of SOEs outputs in total industrial outputs
The share of secondary sector in total GDP

Urbanization

The share of urban population in total population

Openness
Schooling

The ratio of total trade (exports and imports) to GDP
Average years of schooling of population

Inflation
Tax reform 2002

Annual percentage change in consumer price index
=1 if year 2002 and after; 0 otherwise

Revenue decentralization
Equalization effort 1

Equalization effort 2

Equalization effort 3

Equalization effort 4
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Source
Prefecture, City, and County
Public Finance Statistics
(PCCPFS); and Authors’
calculations
PCCPFS and Authors’ calculations
PCCPFS and Authors’ calculations
PCCPFS and Authors’ calculations
PCCPFS and Authors’ calculations
PCCPFS and Authors’ calculations
PCCPFS and Authors’ calculations
PCCPFS and Authors’ calculations
PCCPFS and Authors’ calculations
China Statistical Yearbook
China Statistical Yearbook
China
Compendium
of
Statistics 1949-2008
China
Compendium
of
Statistics 1949-2008
China Statistical Yearbook
Chen et al. (2004) and Authors’ calculations
China Statistical Yearbook
Authors’ calculations

